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ON GRISWOLD AND WOMEN'S EQUALITY
Vivian E. HamiltonI
Thank you to Ernie Walton and the Center for Global Justice,
Human Rights, and the Rule of Law for inviting me to participate in
today's Symposium. I divide my comments today into three parts. First,
I'll discuss how the Supreme Court has come to view the nature of the
individual rights that first received Constitutional protection in Griswold
v. Connecticut.1 Then, I'll turn to the effect of Griswold and its progeny on
women's social and economic equality in the U.S. And finally, I'll offer
some thoughts on the future and challenges that continue to face women
who seek equal opportunities to define for themselves how their lives
should go.
I. GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT (AND PROGENY)
In Griswold, the Supreme Court held that a state law
criminalizing the use of contraception violated married couples' privacy
rights. 2 The decision promised that couples would be free from state
intrusion into the bedroom.3 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the
Court extended the same protection to unmarried couples.4
The Court in Griswold found the right to privacy implicit in the
various provisions of the Bill of Rights.5 Justice Goldberg's concurrence,
moreover, pointed to the Ninth Amendment's assurance that the
enumeration of certain rights should not be construed to deny the
existence of others. 6 In other words, the Framers understood the
impossibility of cataloging all individual rights entitled to Constitutional
protection (one of the reasons given by Alexander Hamilton for excluding
from the Constitution altogether a Bill of Rights).7 The Ninth Amendment
clarifies that the list of rights spelled out in the Bill of Rights is not an
exhaustive one.8
Nonetheless, Constitutional originalists have long criticized the
t Cabell Research Professor f Law, William & Mary School of Law. I thank the
Institute at Regent University for inviting me to participate in this Symposium, and Charles
Alvis for excellent research assistance.
1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2 Id. at 485.
3 See id. at 485-86.
4 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443, 454-55 (1972).
5 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
6 Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 486-89, 489 n.4.
8 Id. at 492.
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approach taken by the Griswold Court.9 And I think the Court has
responded by better explaining the nature of the privacy right in its later
decisions. Eisenstadt v. Baird more explicitly grounded the right to
privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the liberty guaranteed
by that provision. 10 In Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court held in 2003
that criminalizing gay sex was not within the Constitutional power of the
states," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "[1]iberty ... presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct.... [L]iberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex." 12
Justice Kennedy also takes a jab at strict interpretationists. In
surmising why the Framers did not explicitly include the right to adult
consensual intimate conduct (including same-sex conduct), he writes in
Lawrence, "[h]ad those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been
more specific. They did not presume to have this insight."13 The document
that establishes the foundational principles of the nation's government
and rights of individuals within it is not a statute or administrative
regulation; it's a Constitution.
Griswold and its progeny thus establish that we individuals have
a Constitutionally-protected liberty interest in private intimate conduct.14
Pure moral disapproval of conduct is not a sufficient reason for the state
to prohibit conduct. For example, the Court held that the Texas statute
criminalizing gay sex "further[ed] no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."15
9 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1971) (arguing that Griswold "is an unprincipled decision, both in the
way in which it derives a new constitutional right and in the way it defines that right, or
rather fails to define it"); Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial
Hubris, 102 MIcH. L. REV. 1555, 1597-98 (2004) ("The Griswold-Roe-Lawrence line of cases
has no apparent basis in the text or original meaning of the Due Process Clauses, and the
Justices have never tried to show that there is one."). Cf. Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right
to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 742-43 (2010) (suggesting that progressives should
answer these criticisms by reclassifying privacy rights as liberty rights).
10 See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 197-98 (arguing that Eisenstadt "unmasks Griswold as based on
the idea of sexual liberty rather than privacy" because the law challenged in Eisenstadt
restricted the distribution rather than the use of contraceptives).
11 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 578-79 (2003).
12 Id. at 562, 572 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 578-79 (emphasis added).
14 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453-54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
15 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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Today we understand "privacy" to be an essential aspect of
"liberty," the essence of which is "[1]iberty . . . from unwarranted
government[al] intrusion[]." 16
II. THE IMPACT OF GRISWOLD
Griswold meant that women were guaranteed the liberty to
control when and whether to bear children-in other words, it promised
procreative liberty for women. 17 There was no mention by the Griswold
majority of the equality guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment (it
wasn't until 1971 that the Court would read the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide meaningful protection from
discrimination based on sex).18 Griswold, however, has had a tremendous
effect on women's equality gains in social and economic life. 19
The economy where a single wage-earner could earn enough to
support a family is past-in fact, it was a short-lived historical
aberration.20 That means that families need women to earn wages and
participate in the workplace. 21 And once in it, the ability to plan
childbearing has meant that women have the opportunity to participate,
not as second-class citizens, but instead on equal terms.22
Research has found that access to birth control "before age 21 has
been ... the most influential factor in enabling women" enrolled in college
to remain in and graduate from college.23 Women can time childbearing
so as to complete studies and obtain the education required to survive,
compete, and succeed in today's information/technology/service-driven
economy.24 Studies have attributed "one-third of the wage gains women
have made since the 1960s . . . [to their] access to oral contraceptives."25
Guaranteeing to women the ability to control the timing of
childbearing has thus had effects that have reached far beyond the specific
16 Id. at 562.
17 See Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124
YALE L.J. FORUM 349, 349-50 (2015).
18 See id.; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
19 See NAT. WOMEN'S L. CTR., 50 Years After the Griswold us. Connecticut Decision
(June 2015), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/griswoldanniversary_6.2.155.pdf.
20 See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 155-56 (1992).
21 See id.
22 See PLANNED PARENTHOOD, BIRTH CONTROL HAS EXPANDED OPPORTUNITY FOR
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realm of family planning and reproductive rights. As Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg recently observed, "[t]he ability of women to participate equally
in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives."26
III. CURRENT AND FUTURE LANDSCAPE
At the same time, women have not yet achieved full equality in
the workplace.27 The wage gap is smallest in the lowest-paying jobs-so
women cashiers earn about ten cents to the dollar less than men in those
same jobs.28 But the wage gap increases significantly when we compare
men and women in the higher paying jobs. Women lawyers, for example,
earn about 79 cents to the dollar (or about 21 cents less than men
lawyers).29 Part of that difference can be attributed to women taking time
out of the labor force when they have children.30 But nearly 40 percent of
that difference is unaccounted for.31
Women continue to face challenges to their ability to access
reproduction-related health care.32 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Stores, Inc.,
for example, employers who objected on religious grounds to certain forms
of contraception challenged federal regulations mandating that employers
provide group health insurance with coverage for contraceptives (known
as the "contraceptive mandate").33
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court construed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) to require the Federal
Government to provide exemptions to corporations like Hobby
26 Burwellv. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787-88 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992).
27 MICHELLE KELSO ET AL., GENDER EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT: POLICIES AND
PRACTICES IN SWITZERLAND AND THE U.S. 6 (2012), https://www2.gwu.edu/-igis/assets/d
ocs/report-gender-equality-switzerland-2012.pdf.
28 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REP. 1051, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN
2013, at 16 tbl.2 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/archive/highl
ights-of-womens-earnings-in-2013.pdf.
29 Id. at 4, 12.
30 See Claire Cain Miller & Liz Alderman, Why U.S. Women Are Leaving Jobs Behind,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/upshot/us-employment-
women-not-working.html?_r=0.
31 See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends,
and Explanations, Institute for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 9656 (Jan. 2016),
http://ftp.iza.org/dp9656.pdf; see also Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Gender
Differences in Pay, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 82 (2000).
32 See AM. AsS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: NEW BEGINNINGS,
CONTINUED CHALLENGES 1 (2011), http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/position-on-reprod
uctive-rights- 112.pdf.
33 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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Lobby. 34 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito found that the
contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial burden on the employer
corporations' sincerely held religious beliefs.35 RFRA therefore required
the government to show that the mandate was the least restrictive means
of furthering a compelling government interest. 36 Even if "the
[governmental] interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four
challenged contraceptive methods is compelling," however, the majority
held that the contraceptive mandate was not the least restrictive means
available to the government o further that interest.37
Furthermore, state legislatures continue to pass measures whose
effect is to restrict women's access to contraception and abortion. Two days
ago, for example, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Whole Woman's
Health v. Hellerstedt. 38 The case challenges a 2013 Texas law that
requires clinics that perform abortions to meet standards imposed on
surgical centers and requires that doctors that work there have admitting
privileges at nearby hospitals.39 These requirements, if upheld, would
effectively require many clinics to close their doors. 40 The ostensible
purpose of these laws (and anti-abortion lawmakers in other states have
recently enacted similar measures) is to protect women's health. 41 But
clinics that perform procedures that are many times as risky as abortions
(including liposuction and colonoscopies) aren't required to meet these
heightened standards. 42 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked Texas
Solicitor General Scott Keller how many women would have to travel more
than 100 miles to obtain abortion services if the law went into effect.43 His
response was 25 percent, but suggested that many of those women could
travel to New Mexico-where it happens, clinics are not required to meet
34 Id. at 2781.
35 Id. at 2769 (finding for the first time that closely held for-profit corporations could
be considered "persons" with protected religious beliefs).
36 Id. at 2758.
37 Id. at 2780. The Court thus reached its decision on statutory grounds and did not
address Hobby Lobby's claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id.
at 2785.
38 The opinion for Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), has
since been released. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the requirements
constituted an undue burden on women's ability to access previability abortions and thus
violated the Constitution. Id. at 2309-20.
39 Id. at 2300.
40 Id. at 2304, 2306, 2312.
41 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-38, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
42 Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2315.
43 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 36-37.
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the stringent requirements imposed by the Texas law. 44
Today, virtually all women-regardless of religious background-
use contraception in some period over the course of their lives. 45 "Virtually
all" means over ninety-nine percent. 46 This widespread use of
contraception suggests that while childbearing is an important part of
most women's lives, it is also important to (virtually all) women that we
be able to determine if and when to bear children. Childbearing is
rendered no less meaningful (and is arguably more meaningful) when it is
intended. Today, however, nearly half of all pregnancies are unintended,
and unwanted; and about one-half of all unwanted pregnancies (about a
third of all pregnancies) end in abortion.47 Throwing up all manner of
obstacles to women seeking to carry out a decision to end a pregnancy, as
Texas has done, does nothing to support women's health. Ensuring
meaningful access to contraception and healthcare more broadly, however,
not only supports women's health, but also respects women's liberty,
equality, and dignity.
44 Id. at 37-38.
45 See GUTTMACHER INST., CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE UNITED STATES: FACT SHEET
1(2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/contraceptive-use-united-states.
46 Id.
47 GUTTMACHER INST., UNINTENDED PREGNANCIES IN THE U.S.: FACT SHEET (2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states.
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